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REVIEbl OF PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE 
-I-- 
5TH ELECTROEXPLOSIVE ---- DEVICE SYMPOSIUM 
E. E. VANLANDINGH~~ 
Probleins associated w i  t h  the safe and re1 i ab1 e use of el ectroexplosi ve 
devices and associated coinponents have stimulated valuable t h i n k i n g  i n  
the design, development and subsequent, usage of 'these units. A t  the 
recent 5 t h  E.E.D. Symposium the results of a number of research and 
development programs were presented. As can be seen from the brief 
review t o  follow, the electroexplosive units discussed are obviously 
, 
designed t o  meet certain operational and functional requireme~ts , how- 
ever prim consideration has been given t o  safety associated w i t h  the 
use o f  the devices. 
development of  a 15 second delay squib by the McConnick-Selph Company 
The f i r s t  paper t o  be discussed reviews the 
under contract t o  Douglas Aircraft Company and was presented a t  the 
Symposium by Mr. S id  Moses. o f  Douglas. 
The'failure o f  a Delta Space Vehicle f l i g h t  i n  August of 1965 was traced 
t o  malfunction of a delay squib which caused premature ignition of the 
t h i r d  stage motor. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Goddard. Space Flight Center (Goddard) , decided t o  replace i t  w i t h  a 
new, h i g h  r e l i ab i l i t y  device. 
Space Systems Division (Douglas} was contracted t o  prepare a specifi-  
cation for a niiw squib.  
Douglas Aircraft Company, Missile & 
I t  wasdecided t h a t  the delay s q u i b  should be a single circuit 'device 
rather t h a n  the more 'conventional two c i rcu i t  devices which have been 
popular.  Th i s  was based on the conviction t h a t  ihe modern EED, hav ing  
a flush bridgewire and a pressed prime, has v i r tua l ly  eliminated the 
broken bridgewire problem. With a single c i rcu i t  EED, sone weight saving 
could be schi eved i n  the w i  ri ng system and possi bl e ci rcui t-to-ci rcui t 
probl ms were el imi nated. 
s9L-, ? B CHARACTE RI ST I CS 
Goddard awarded a contract t o  McComick-Selph o f  
f o r  the development and qualjfication o f  this 15 
Hol1 i s t e r  , Cal i forni a ,  
second delay squib. 
2. 
A scheaatic design is  shown on figure 1. For this development, McCorinick- 
Selph u t i l i z i d  two interesting proprietary materials: (1) The i n i t i a t i n g  
explosive around the bridgewire i s  a high-temperature s table ,  no 
material. Both  the material and i t s  residue combustion products are non- 
conductive. (2 )  The delay column i s  a pyrotechnic, prepack 
tube, which is then drawn t o  a diameter of less t h a n  0.1 inc 
by McComick-Selph as Small Colunn Insulated Delay (SCID). 
the IS second dclay squib is completely gasless and has n deflagration 
rate of 14 seconds per foot .  Based on the Development and Quaitfication 
Program, the s q u i b  has the following characterist ics a t  70’F. 
’ The SCID i n  
A. When calculated a t  the 95 percent confidence level: 
1. A t  l e a s t  99.9 percent of  the squibs have a five minute 
no f i r e  of 1.72 amperes (approximately 2.1 watts) which 
exceeds the no-fire safety requirement of 1.0 anpere 
(1 .O watt) .  
2, At l ea s t  99.9 percent of the squibs will have a delay of ’ 
between 1’4.8 and 16.8 seconds. 
8. When calcuiated a t  the 90’ percent confidence level : 
1 A t  l e a s t  99.9 percent of  the squibs require a min imum 
a l l - f i r e  current of 3.47 amperes for a 20 ms pulse. 
2. The squib  i n i t i a t o r  has a demonstrated r e l i ab i l i t y  o t  
99.36 percent when f i red w i t h  a 4.0 ampere, 20 millf- 
second pulse based on 370 firings. 
’ 
Y 
\ -- DEGRADATION .. TESTS 
Test squibs were subjected t o  25 applications of t e s t s  measuring insu la t ion  
resistance, dielectr iq  strength and e lec t ros ta t ic  discharge. ‘In addition, 
t e s t  squibs were subjected t o  a current of 20 milliamperes for a period 
of 24 hours representing a small leakage through the electr ical  c i rcui t .  
None of these t e s t s  degraded the firing characterist ics of the squ ib .  
Test squibs were subjected t o  25 cycles of the 1 .O ampere no-fire current. 
After this t e s t ,  the squibs functioned i n  a nonnal manner. In subsequent 
t c s t s ,  two in i t i a to r s  were subjected to 52 cycles of  the no-fire current 
for 2-1/2 minutes followed by a f ive minute cooling period. A f t  
t e s t  the I’nitiators were functioned a t  4.0 aiiiperes. The bridgawirc  
burnout time of 2.6 milliseconds for the squibs tested is  comparable t o  
3. 
i 
an average o f  2.4 milliseconds for the 72 qualification fikings. 
McConiiick-Selph stored the delay squibs a t  160°F for eight !hours, 130°F 
for  72 hours ark! 112°F for 336 hours. The squibs were then fired i n  a 
lOcc pressure chamber and behaved i n  a normal manner. 
. ELECTROSTATIC -.. .. PROTECTION 
Because o f  a previous lethal accident caused by s t a t i c  e l ec t r i c i ty ,  
extra precautions were taken i n  making this s q u i b  safe from electro-'  
s t a t i c  discharges (ESD). A review of ESD protection devices indicated 
t o  Goddard-Douglas tha t  a preferential a i r  gap between the electr ical  
lead-in pins of the squib and the metal case appeared t o  offer  the best 
protcctl'on available. 
a small a i r  g a p  w i t h o u t  passing through the explosive primer material 
around the bridgewire. 
t rol led t o  break down between 1000 and 3500 volts dc. A preferential 
a i r  gap i s  protection only i f  i t  can be determined that  i t  is preferential. 
T h a t  i s ,  the primer material around the bridgewire must be insulated so 
t h a t  breakdown does n o t  occur t h r o u g h  this material. 
squibs, breakdown of the primer cavity d i d  no t  occur a t  10,000 vdc pro- 
v i d i n g  a factor of  safety of a t  l eas t  3:1 over the maximum breakdown of  
the preferential gap. 
Th i s  allows an electrostat ic  spark to  juinp across 
In the production s q u i b ,  this a i r  g a p  was con- 
W i t h  development 
RF SENSITIVITY 
As part  of the development program, 270 in , i t ia tors  were sent to  Franklin 
- . Ins t i tu te  -_ fo r  RF'sensitivity tests. 
1 -__ 
As.an additional safeguard .against RF, a Douglas lossy l i n e  ( s k i n  effect)  
f i l t e r  is installed on'the s q u i b  i n  the spacecraft. 
similar t o  one described by klarner and Klamt a t  the Second Hero Congress 
i n  1963. 
rahge from 0.1 t o  10,000 MHz. 
T h i s  f i l t e r  is 
I t  provides from 10 t o  80 db protection,over the frequency 
I t  appears tha t  the time delay i n i t i a t o r  developed under this program 
wili offer an effective solution t o  the Delta programs operational re- 
quirements vehicle a t  the  same time a h i g h  degree of safety is designqd 
i n t o  the device. 
tho  second p$per t o  be discussed was presented by Mr, t o  
o f  the Raval 'Ordnance Lab. and presents the results of f 
mant 'work on a \dater Am-Air Safe Detonator or iginal ly  d 
Stresau and Siie. L .  
Current Navy design practice fo r  explosive trains is  t o  interrupt the 
4 action of the sensi t ive explosives between the in i t i a to r  and the i n p u t  
t o  the lead and/or booster. The explosive action is interruped t o  
avoid accidents from unintentional in i t ia t ion  of the "sensJLfve" 
explosives i n  the t ra in .  This has previously been accomplished by 
interposit ion of barr iers  and/or by misalighment of the t r a in  cclrnponents. 
A second Navy requirement is tha t  arming, or alignment of t h e  displaced 
components, for exaiiipl e detonator t o  7 ead, be accompli shed a f t e r  1 aunch. 
In underwater ordnance, such arming i s  usual l y  accompli shed by mwhani cal 
means, actuated by eS ther water pressure o r  moveinent of the dovice 
through water. 
A t h i r d  Navy requirement is tha t  any explosive used beyond the inter-  
rupter shall be no more sensitive than the Navy standard o f  t e t ry l .  
An appealing approach t o  the development of systems which a re  t o  ann 
a f t e r  water entry is t o  u t i l i ze  the difference between the confining 
action o f  air aqd o f  water t o  control propagation o f  detonation. 
. 
'. Stresau and Slie invented a 9Jater Confinement Aniiing Device" using 
t h 6  above different ia l  confinement principle. This i s  a device whfch 
I t  does not 
depend on physical interruption of the column t o  prevent detonation 
propagation when i n  a i r .  The detonator, as further refined by Stresau 
i s  shown i n  figure 2, 
' will propagate t o  detqnation only when immersed i n  water. 
I 
Thc urifque feature of this des ign  is  tha t  a l i gh t ly  confined column of 
explosive i s  surrounded by an annular a i r  cavity and, i n  turn, by a 
rclntivc'ly heavy inotal' tubc. The diameter o f  the column of *oxplosivc 
1s choscn so tha t  i t  is less than the f a i lu re  diameter when the ilnnular 
cavity is  f i l l e d  w i t h  air, and 'larger t h a n  i ts  fa i lure  diameter when 
this sanie cavjty i s  f i l l ed  w i t h  water. Th i s  change i n  "fiajlurc diameter" 
is the resuliPof the greater effectiveness of water as 1 .  a confining nediurn. 
This e f fec t  is. further increased by the reflected shock wave from the 
surrounding tube. 
Stresau i n  his original assessment o f  safety and r e l i ab i l i t y  used a 
ri terion" for a detonator fa i lure  i n  a i r .  That i s ,  when his 
device was in i t ia ted  i n  a i r ,  explosives could propagate to  and t h r o u g h  
the base charge, b u t  could not produce, any nieasurablc dcnt i n  a steel 
witness block used t o  nieasure base charge - ~ .  o u t p u t ,  . .. However ,this design 
when f i red i n  sir occassionally perinit.ted complete burn ing  of the base 
charge explosive. , 
The purpose of this report is t o  describe work a t  the Naval Ordnance 
Laboratory undertaken t o  further the deve! opment of an explosi ve device 
of this type. i 
a. Study feas ib i l i ty  of  using higher density nitroguanidine 
t o  increase mechanical s t a b i  1 i ty  t o  vibrational forces. 
b. Quench burn ing  action when f i red i n  a i r ,  
c. Verify confinement enhancement e f fec t  of s teel  jacket when 
i n  water. 
d. Improve fabrication methods: shorter column, bet ter  p las t ic  
t u b i n g  materi,al. 
e. Make item capable of meeting usual surveillance conditions 
c 
\ for expl osi ve components , i .e. M i  1 -Std-304 temperature-humi d i  ty  
cycl e. 
, '  
, . A  detailed report of the results of this investigation are given i n  
Mr. Montesi's paper, hhwever, a brief summary i s  as follows. 
The f irst  t e s t s  conducted were t o  determine the opt'imum charge density 
of the nitroguanidine transmission charge. I t  can be concluded from the 
arge density should be resul ts  t h a t ,  oquanidine t r a n w  ch 
less t h a n  0.80 gmlcm and more ,man 0.35-  1 for rel iable  i n i t i a t i o n  
af the ba- e i n  water. As regards safety,  or chance i n i m o n  
I .  
. .  
# 
' --
o f  the base charge i n  a i r ,  no h i g h  order in i t ia t ion  of  the base charge 
occurred over the en t i re  density range. 
E, ' 
In. ddditiorr 'Po these t e s t s  the propagation veloci t y  of nitroguanidine 
a t  various densities was measured underwater using a 35 inm sinear camera. 
The propagation velocities of nitroguanidine were meas 
configurations: w i t h ,  and without the 'outer inetal confinin 
ea r l i e r  s ta ted it was suspected t h a t  the shock wave unde 
reinforced by the reflected shock wave from this  conf jn ing  tube. The 
results o f  these tes t s  although inconclusive appear t o  support this  
suspicion. 
as the density of the n i  troguanidi ne transmission charge i ncreilses 
I t  i s  also evident t h a t  the propagation velocity increases 
Tcs t s  were conducted t o  detcmii ne the olpimu;ii barrier t h i  ckness requi red 
for reliable de tona t ion  transfer i n  water, 
successful f i r e s  made w i t h  barriers ranging i n  thickness from 40 t o  200 
mils. Nineteen o u t  of 19 f i r e s  were observed w i t h  a barrier thickness 
o f  150 mils, a thickness nearly four times greater t h a n  the intended 
40* m i  1 design thickness 
There were 54 o u t ' o f  54 
~+; 
The safety aspects of the WARAS Device tested i n  a i r  were assessed 
using the VARICOMP test procedure. To prove t h a t  detonation will n o t  
propagate i n  air from n i t roguan id ine  t o  the CH-6 base charge across 
the 40-mil thick aluminum more sensitive explosives--PETN and Calcium 
Stearate-RDX, (1,65/98.35) were substituted-for the CH-6 below the 
aluminum barrier. 
charge i s  changed. * 
As an additional conservatism a l l  of the safety t e s t s  were conducted 
w i t h  a thinner barrier than  is intended i n  the final design, $ .a .  25 
mils instead of 40 mi'ls. 
I t  should  be noted t h a t  only the CH-6 i n  the base 
Three types of quenching were noted: ( a )  somewhere i n  the nitroguanidine 
colurrn leaving some unburned nitroguanidine, ( b )  somewhere i n  the inter- 
mediate CII-6 charge above the a1 uininum darrier leaving some unburned 
CH-6, and (c) quenching a t  the barrier w i t h  a l l  explosives above the 
barrier being consumad, Only when the l a t t e r  outcome was observed was 
there any chance of i n i t i a t i n g  the VARICOMP explosive. 
7. 
The safety and r e l i ab i l i t y  aspects of the \!BRAS Detonator were deemd 
acceptabl e w i t h  a 40-mil t h i  ck a1 umi num barrier.  
, 
The device d i d  not pass the tmperature-humidity t e s t ,  a concentrated 
e f for t  i n  tha t  direction is  being made, 
Leakzge was traced to:  ( a )  poor epoxy seals, ( b )  p i n  holes i n  the tube 
( i t  seems tha t  i t  is possible to  get  p i n  holes i n  tubes of 2 mils wall 
thickness),  (c)  tube punctures dur ing  joading. 
I t  appears essential to  e i ther  increase the wall thickness o f  the t u b i n g  
o r  have inspection techniques' tha t  will preclude the acceptance of t u b i n g .  
hav ing  p i n  holes or other leaks. 
d u r i n g  the loading process the use o f  thicker tubes i s  going t o  be investi- 
gated. The use G f  a thicker tube will necessitate aweconfirnation of 
the safety and reliab'ility estimates already made. 
Since damage t o  the tubes may occur 
An cnti  rely different  approach t o  the design o f  el ectroexplosi ve devices 
was given i n  a paper presented by Mr. D.  J .  Lewis o f  the Space Ordnance 
Systems Company. 
On the basis o f  
LASER ENERGIZED EXPLOSIVE D E V I C E  --.-. . ..- .. .. . . .------_1._1_ 
several prel imi nary ex p e r i 111 en Is u t i  1 i z i  ng a 1 aser' t o  
i n i t i a t e  explosi&ves, the Space Ordnance System Company dectded t o  
I' investigate laser-energized systems. 
, could be in i t ia ted  us ing  coherent l i g h t  as a source o f  energy anti a 
means found t o  transmit i t  t o  various components (detonators, ic*i t i a to r s ,  
igni ters ,  e tc . ) ,  one could n o t  only .eliminate the RF, e lec t ros ta t ic ,  and 
EM1 probleiiis, b u t  m i g h t  possibly arr ive a t  a systeiii tha t  was a great  deal 
The  reasons were; i f  explosives 
s iiiipl c r i n dcs i g n . 
The LEED system {Laser Energized Explosive Device) el iminstes the use 
o f  a l l  connecting metall ic l ines ,  bridgewires, spark gaps, ceramic 
hccdcrs , ctc .  Thc l aser  source crci les  an cncrgy pulse which i s  trans- 
a i  rtcci via non-metal f ic,  f i bcr opt ic  conductors direct ly  t o  the pyro- 
technic CGmpOund t o  produce the required reaction. A schematic of this 
u n i t  Ss shown i n  f igure 3, . 
A simp1 i f i d  b u t  !nformatigve explanation of the operatiidn o f  lasers 
this concept is given i n  Mr. Lewis's paper. 
i n  general and t h a  specific application o f  lasers and f f  t o  
The i n i t i a t o r  used w i t h  the LEED system looks exactly l ike a nonnal 
EBW or hot br idgwire  u n i t  on the outside, 
s iinpf e i n design A1 1 bri dgewi res, spark gaps , p i  ns , cerami c headers , 
insulators, e tc . ,  have been elininated and the device siinply contains 
the explosive compound sealed i n  by means of a glass window. 
glass i tsef f is  a h i g h  qual i ty  infrared transmitting glass w i t h  tapered 
conical shaped edges which recol limates the  laser  bean being received 
from the optical f iber and loads the window optimally. The windows are 
designed, and hava been tested, t o  withstand up t o  100,000 psi End allow 
thhe application of laser l i g h t  on the explosive compound over a 0.01 i n 2  
area, 
I t  i s  however, extremely 
Tha 
~ 
i 
-.-- 
OfiG of the most intefesting features of the LEEO system i s  the ease o f  
connecting the opti-caf fibers t o  the end-users: detonators, i n i t i a to r s ,  
etc,  The system does not require any s-peci-a'i methods of optical f i be r  
end-coating, g r i n d i n g ,  or special geometry and the opt ical  f iber  ends 
can be cut and mated t o  the connector i n  simple fashion, 
The connectors do n o t  have t o  be water or moisture t i g h t  since these 
environments do,not effect  the transmission of energy from the donor 
t o  the receiving f iber ,  
The LEED systeni is coinpletely insensitive t o  2F and e lectrostat ic  
energies. The only physical connection t o  a de tona tor  or i n i t i a t o r ,  
or group of these devices, i s  the series ' o f  optical  fibers. The 
coherent l i g h t  moves, independently of these f i e lds ,  t o  the explosive 
device and causes the pyrotechnic reaction. Since the opt ica l  f'ibers 
and thhe ordnance devices are immune t o  reaction of these f ie lds ,  (they 
contain no el ectr i  cal circuitry or are pure Faraday shields; r ad ia t ion  
has no means by which St can produce e f fec ts ) ,  the system is completely 
safe and reliable,  
9. 
Accidently setting off the LEED systein by nieans of extra&ous l i g h t  
sources is very nearly impossible fo r  the following reasqns: 
a. 
5 ,  
High intensi ty  non-coherent sources a re  very nearly qon-existent. 
Tests w i t h  output energy as h i g h  as 5000 joules,  usiig non-coherent 
sources, have been focused into the fibers and have n o t  s e t  off  
any reaction. 
Due t o  the characterist ics of the fi'bcr optics,  unless the 
energy it; is transmitting i s  coherent , the phenomenon necessary fo r  
pyrotechnic reaction will n o t  be present and since there i s  no 
natural l y  coherent sources, thehazard is el  iminated. 
c. The f iber  is  t o t a l ly  internally reflecting and, hence, i s  t o t a l ly  
external l y  ref1 ecting . Therefore no energy w i  7 1 be recei Ged by 
the f iber  unless i t  is  w i t h i n  the acceptance angle of the f ibe r  
which is  below 9 degrees. 
I 
b. 
L 
I t  can be seen tha t  a very h i g h  intensity l i g h t  (higher than the f l u x  
density of the surface"of the 'sun) that  is coherent, a t  the r i g h t  
frequency to  transmit e f f ic ien t ly  clown the f iber ,  and w i t h i n  the accept- 
ance angle o f  the f ibe r  must be used. 
The LEED system power supply i s  adaptable to  the normal electric(i1 
systems used i n  a i r c r a f t ,  missiles and spacecraft. The systeni operatcs 
i n  a similar fashion t o  an EBW systein. 
A low voltage source, i r e r 2  DC battery o r  400 cycles AC, j s  used as 
i n p u t  energy. Th i s  is  then stepped up t o  a higher voltage and charged 
into a capacitor. The capacitor is  then "duniped" into the optical 
pumping source, which may be a xenon flashlamp, to ,  create the necessary 
population inversion i n  the ruby or neodymium rod. Basically, the 
system is a low voltage, to  h i g h  voltage s & p u p , ' t o  energy storage, 
and then via an electr ical  switch, to  the flashlamp. 
1 
. 
' 
Following further development thSs concept could offer  an a t t rac t ive  
solution t o  many o f  the opcratlonal and safety problems currently being 
experienced f n  missile systems. . ,  
An area o f  defini te  concern t o  users of electroexp7osivo.devices is the 
S tJb i? i ty  o f  RDX i n  shape charge since this is a systein often uscd i n  
conjunction w i t h  E.E.D.iss. fhe resul ts  of cln interesting study i n  this 
regards were pr ented by Dr, N. J ,  BoLhan and Mr. E. F. Knippenb 
the General Electric Company. 
M i t h i n  recent years f lexible  l inear  shaped charge (FLSC) has received 
widespread acceptance w i t h i n  the aerospace industry and i s  currently 
being used i n  a nuinber of missile and spacecraft systems. 
i n  mSssite stage separatibn applications offers several inportant design 
advantages. 
l igh ter  weight structures as compared t o  alternate systms. 
Use of FLSC 
In particular,  i t s  use generally resul ts  i n  significantly 
FLSC contains a continuous core o f  h i g h  explosive encased i n  a t h i n  
metal sheath. Almost a l l  FLSC manufactured and ut i l ized t o  date  consists 
of an RDX explosive core i n  a lead alloy sheath. Originally FLSC was 
fabricated w i t h  a 'cardiod cross-sectional shape. More recently a chevron 
shape has been employed, as i t  was found  t o  give significantly improved 
cutting perfoniiance. hlhile the chevron shape is  opt imum from an explosives 
performance standpoint, i t  is  somewhat f ragi le  from a mechanical p o i n t  
o f  view. 
been found t o  be easily distorted by internal gas pressure generated 
dur ing  storage or  testing a t  elevated temperatures. When subjected t o  
increasing internal pressure, the chevron shape has been found t o  gradually 
defom i n t o  a shape approaching a triangle. Wi th  the loss of the chevron 
shape, the cutting ab i l i t y  drast ical ly  degrades. 
In particular the t h i n  mctal sheath o f  this configtmtfon has 
' 
In actual appl icat ia is  the shaped charge is provided w i t h  end-seals t o  
prevent moisture from being absorbed i n t o  the RDX core sir,ce th i s  can 
destroy the detonating properties of RDX. 
of the FLSC constituents, o r  of the end-seal materials, resu l t  i n  the 
Thus ,  any chemical i n s t ab i l i t l e s  
gcneratim of gases which will gradually d i s to r t  the chevron shape and 
degrade i ts  cutting properties. Therefore, i t  is  essential tha t  the 
ingredSents and sealing materials used i n  the FLSC possess a h i g h  degree 
of cheni cal stabi 1 i ty a t  el evated temperatures 
11. 
In order t o  study the variables involved i n  thermal s t aMl i ty  o f  RDX, 
two samples o f  this explosive were obtained from the Canadian Arsenal Ltd.  
The f irst  sample was designated as Type B indicating that  i t  was made by 
the Bachinnn process which uti;l izes acet ic  anhydride as the ni t ra t ion 
medium. This resul ts  ' i n  the'formation of from 8 t o  '10% o f  HMX as a 
bi-product. i 
The second sample, normally referred t o  as Type A R D X ,  was made by the 
Brit ish process which  uses only nitric acid and results i n  less t h a n  1% 
of HHX being formed. 
There were a wide variety o f  theories as to  the cause of  t h e  ins tab i l i ty  
found i n  shaped charge made from RDX. 
and each was studied experimentally and most of them eliminated, The 
general classes are  as follows: 
They can be divided into classes 
'I. Sheath materials ar,d/or moisture. The usual material for shaped 
charge sheath i s  antimonial lead b u t  pure lead and aluniinurn have 
also been used. 
lated between RDX and the sheath material. 
2. Additives 
3. Materials used i n  Raking adequate end-seals i n  shaped charge 
sys tens. 
4. Impuri$ies i n  the RDX. 
Moisture may enter into the reaction postu- 
The Bowman-Sni ppenberg study produced the fo l l  owing : 
$ 1. The lead-water-RDX interaction does lead t o  the evolution 
of gas, b u t  at a very slow rate .  The ballooning of shaped 
charge cannot be explained on the basis of this reaction alone. 
The following was also found: 
a. An increase i n  the percentage of lead (surface arc?a o f  
contact) causes an increase i n  the r a t e  of gas evolution. 
b. An increase i n  the percentage of water leads to  an 
increase i n  the ra te  of gas evolution, 
2. Hydrogen, even i f  f~nf ied by the reaction of lead and water, 
does not react w i t h  RDX appreciably t o  fom volat i le  mines. 
., ,- 
I d .  
3 ,  
5, 
8, 
9, 
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The pre‘sence of aluminum of thhe type used i n  sh is ’ ih  matcrials, 
as strong as lead ( tens i le  strength rcughly ten times 6s h i g h )  
and i t  was no t  possible to  ge t  bal looning even a t  350°F as the 
end-seals consistently fa i led  f i r s t .  
t h a t ,  w i t h  a l  utxi num sheathed shaped charge, bal i o  
n o t  occur u n t i l  a h i g h  internal pressure has been germeated. 
I t  is  probable t h a t  the seals will f a i l  befGre this necessary 
pressure i s reached. 
Any PbO fomed by the reaction of water and lead does not  ac t  
t a  accelerate the deconiposition o f  RDX. 
prcsence o f  HMX has no effect  on thhe s t ab i l i t y  of RDX. 
Duponol (ah an t i s t a t i c  agent) i n  the amounts usually present 
d t o  evolution of gas. Aluminum everal “Lir?,es 
it i s  therefore concluded 
a s l ight  increase i n  gas evoluYion. Duponol i n  
ts is known t o  lead t o  thennal instabi l i ty .  
Rhodamine ( a  dye) i n  the amounts usually present i n  shaped 
charge does n o t  affect  thennal s t ab i l i t y  o f  2DX. 
No fibers were found i n  the raw RCX upon nricro:;copic exmination 
o f  the two samples t h a t  were available, From this i t  hiis been 
concluded t h a t  raw RDX i s  thermally unstable even in the absence 
of f ibers,  although undoubtedly i t  is less s table  i f  cellulose 
f ibers  a re  present (as has been reported). 
M and P-100 (the epoxy resin presently used i n  Mark-6 shaped 
charga,assembl ies) w i  11 cause rapid gas evolution i F  IT COPIES 
IN CONTACT WiTH THE RDX CORE. This may occur throirgh faulty 
preparation of the assemblies. 
particularly w i t h  over  catalyzed M and P-100 w h i c h  will contain 
free TETA. 
Other epoxys tested as replacements for the M and P include: 
Metagrip, CONAP, Arinstrong C7 and Scotchcast No. 10. CCNAP, 
even i n  d i rec t  contact w i t h  RDX, envolvcd only a sixill amount 
o f  gas. 
make i t  undesirable for  use. The second bcst from a gas  evolution 
s t a n d p o i n t  was Scotchcast No. 10, I t  has acceptable physical 
properties and S t s  use is recoii~mended. 
Vapor contact Ss t o  b2 avG5ded 
However, i t s  physical propert? cs ( f l  exibi? i ty parti cul grly) 
13. 
11. The. largest part  of the thermal ins tab i l i ty  o f  '%iwti RDX C G ~ C S  
froiii the impurities which  i t  contains. 
o f  them and i t  is impossible t o  identify any pariicular ones 
tha t  i\re detrimental. The chances are that  many o f  the possible 
impurities have poorer s t ab i l i t y  than the RDX i t s e l f .  There 'are 
others, notably HMX, w h i c h  are more stable. 
$I/ Therc are a t  l ea s t  50 i 
'. I t  has been shown, both  by isoteniscope-gas evolution t e s t s  
" and forced ballooning t e s t s  on shaped charge i t s e l f ,  t h r z t  these 
impuri ties can be removed by recrys ta l  1 i zati  on from acetone. 
I t  i s  important to  note t h a t . a  TRUE RECRYSTALLIZATION i s  required 
using different ia l  solubi l i ty  and no water i n  any fom. The 
tern recrystall ization is  used i n  the explosives industry t o  
include a variety o f  processes i n  which water is  added whfle 
cool i ng o r  evaporating 
I t  is  necessary t o  drythe RDX a t  elevated temperaturs ( 6 5 O C  
t o  80°C) under reduced pressure w i t h  a stream of DRY sir f l o w i n g  
over the surface or through it, 
First calculations have shown tha t  i f  the water content 's above 
O.2%, ballooning of the 15 graSn, lead sheathed shaped charse 
may occur due t o  the vapor pressure of t h e  water alone. Secondly, 
i f  this is n o t  done the RDX may not  be dried homogeneously and focal 
concentrations of water several times the average value may b ~ ?  foirnd. 
8y use of highly purified R D X ,  keeping the water content o f  the 
RDX below 0.22, and us ing  iniprovcd cnd-sml iiiatcrials, C h p c d  
' charge can be made t h a t  i s  s t ab le  indefinitely a t  teiupcratum 
t o  240OF. ., 
12. 
T h i s  i s  required f o r  two reasons. 
73. 
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